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The Universal Blind Quantum Computation (UBQC) protocol [1] allows a client to perform
quantum computation on a remote server. In an ideal setting, perfect privacy is guaranteed if the
client is capable of producing specific, randomly chosen single qubit states. While from a theoretical
point of view, this may constitute the lowest possible quantum requirement, from a pragmatic point
of view, generation of such states to be sent along long distances can never be achieved perfectly.
We introduce the concept of -blindness for UBQC, in analogy to the concept of -security de-
veloped for other cryptographic protocols, allowing us to characterize the robustness and security
properties of the protocol under possible imperfections. We also present a remote blind single qubit
preparation protocol with weak coherent pulses for the client to prepare, in a delegated fashion,
quantum states arbitrarily close to perfect random single qubit states. This allows us to efficiently
achieve -blind UBQC for any  > 0, even if the channel between the client and the server is
arbitrarily lossy.
While modern advances in quantum information are
making strides towards scalable quantum computers, the
dream of small and privately owned quantum computers
remains very distant. Realistically, large quantum servers
may in the near future take a role similar to that occupied
by massive superclusters today. They will be remotely ac-
cessed by a large number of clients, using their home-based
simple devices, to solve tasks which seem difficult for clas-
sical computers, while enjoying full privacy guaranteed by
an efficient cryptographic scheme.
A similar question has been also addressed in the con-
text of classical client-server scenarios. Considering un-
conditional security, Abadi, Feigenbaum and Killian stud-
ied the notion of “computing with encrypted data”, and
showed that no NP-hard function can be computed blindly
if unconditional security is required, unless the polynomial
hierarchy collapses at the third level [2]. A related ques-
tion which offers privacy with computational assumptions,
known as fully homomorphic encryption, remained open
for 30 years [3].
Various protocols have been devised with the goal of re-
alizing such delegated, yet private and secure, quantum
computing [1, 4–7]. These protocols vary upon their re-
quirements for the client and the achievable level of secu-
rity. Among them, the universal blind quantum computing
(UBQC) proposed by Broadbent, Fitzsimons and Kashefi
[1] stands as the optimal one, with the lowest requirements
on the client: in particular, no quantum memory is needed.
The security offered by the ideal UBQC protocol is uncon-
ditional: the server cannot learn anything about the client
computation, input or output. This flavour of security is
called blindness. The feasibility of UBQC using different
physical resources has been addressed [7, 8] and the poten-
tial of UBQC already prompted experimental demonstra-
tions on a small scale [9].
The only ‘non-classical’ requirement for the client in the
ideal UBQC is that she can prepare single qubits in the
state |+θ〉= 1√2
(|0〉+ eiθ|1〉) with θ ∈ {0, pi/4, . . . , 7pi/4}.
The blindness of the UBQC protocol has only been es-
tablished in the ideal case where the client prepares per-
fect qubits. In any physical implementation, however, the
preparation will inevitably be imperfect and this has to
be taken into account before making any statement about
security. For instance, the qubits could be encoded in
the polarization of a single photon generated by a real-
istic single photon source. Then completely suppressing
the probability of inadvertently sending two or more iden-
tically polarized photons instead of one is very difficult,
yet such an event would invalidate the perfect privacy of
the client. While the future may bring scalable and fault-
tolerant quantum computation required for the server, per-
fect quantum devices required to guarantee the perfect se-
curity for the client are unlikely to ever be achieved in
practice.
The main contribution of this paper is towards this di-
rection: we investigate the security of UBQC with realistic
imperfections for the client. For this purpose, we intro-
duce the framework of approximate blindness (-blindness)
where the (small) parameter  quantifies the maximal prob-
ability of successfully distinguishing between the actual
protocol and the ideal one introduced in [1]. A similar
approach to defining approximate security has been a mile-
stone in the context of cryptography, and recently extended
to the case of quantum key distribution (QKD) [10, 11, 27]
and other quantum cryptographic primitives in the, so-
called, bounded storage and noisy storage models [12–14].
We will show that the level of security is indeed higher
when the states prepared by the client are closer to the
ideal qubits. We then introduce a protocol allowing the
client to prepare the qubits in a delegated fashion at the
server’s location. The client needs to encode the quantum
information into the polarization of weak coherent pulses
which are sent to the server through an arbitrarily lossy
quantum channel. Therefore, the burden of preparing very
good qubits is put on the server, who needs in particular to
be able to perform non-demolition quantum measurements
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2[15]. We will show that these realistic requirements (for the
client) are compatible with -blind UBQC, where  can be
made arbitrarily small. This approach shares striking simi-
larities with the history of QKD where the initial protocols
required true single photons but later became compatible
with the much more practical weak coherent pulses.
We begin with a brief recap of the UBQC protocol.
Universal Blind Quantum Computation.— The UBQC
protocol is set in the framework of measurement-based
quantum computation (MBQC) [16–18]. In MBQC the un-
derlying resource is a multipartite entangled quantum state
and the computation is executed by performing measure-
ments on its subsystems. In particular, this resource state
can be a generic brickwork state, a close relative of the clus-
ter state (see the Appendix section B for details). By ap-
plying single qubit measurements parametrized by a mea-
surement angle φ from the discrete set {0, pi/4, . . . , 7pi/4},
which collapse the measured qubit state to one of the two
eigenstates {|±φ〉 = 1√2
(|0〉 ± eiφ|1〉)}, with corresponding
eigenvalues ±1, one can achieve universal quantum compu-
tation [1]. Here, the computation itself is encoded in the
measurement angles alone and the underlying resource is
generic.
The classical and quantum part of MBQC can be con-
ceptually separated. One can imagine a classical controller
which generates the measurement angles and a quantum
unit which prepares the resource state, performs the mea-
surements (as dictated by the controller unit), and returns
the measurement outcomes to the controller unit. The out-
comes are crucial for the adaptive structure of MBQC: since
they are probabilistic, the subsequent measurement angles
must depend on them to ensure deterministic computation
[19, 20].
The central idea behind UBQC is to use this separation
and allocate the classical controller unit to the client and
the quantum unit to the server. To ensure privacy, how-
ever, the computation needs to be encoded: this is achieved
in UBQC by effectively encoding the resource state.
The standard procedure for MBQC, to prepare the re-
source state, is to start with a set of qubits in a fixed state,
say |+〉 := |+0〉, and to apply an entangling operation of
the Controlled Phase gate (ctrl-Z) to some of them.
In UBQC, by contrast, the client will provide the initial
phase rotated qubits of the form |+θ〉 to the server, with-
out informing him of the values of θ ∈ {0, pi/4, . . . , 7pi/4}.
Applying the entangling gates then prepares an encoded
resource state. Now, if one was to measure a qubit in
the usual MBQC protocol with some measurement angle
φ, this would be equivalent to measuring the pre-rotated
qubit (in the state |+θ〉 with the angle δ′ = φ+θ mod 2pi,
as the phase rotation and ctrl-Z gate commute. In this
case, the measurement angle alone says nothing about the
computation run, but a malicious server may still try learn
something about θ when given δ′, hence also about φ (i.e.
about the computation).
To solve this security loophole, UBQC exploits the prob-
abilistic nature of MBQC. The client sends a modified mea-
surement angle δ = φ+θ+rpi mod 2pi, where r ∈ {0, 1} is
chosen randomly by the client and hidden from the server.
The value of r can be interpreted as a flip of the measure-
ment outcome, which can be easily compensated by the
client.
Now the quantum information (pre-rotated qubits) and
classical information (measurement angles) accessible to
the server is no longer correlated to the client’s desired
computational angles (denoted φ), and this constitutes the
crux of the proof of blindness of UBQC [1].
One can summarize the UBQC protocol as follows: Ini-
tially, in the preparation phase, the client sends S (the size
of the computation) randomly pre-rotated qubits in the
states {|+θi〉}Si=1, to the server, keeping the angles θi se-
cret. The server then builds up the brickwork state using
the received qubits and the ctrl-Z interaction. Proceed-
ing sequentially on each qubit, if the desired measurement
angle for qubit i was φi (defined for the non-prerotated
resource state, and including the necessary adaptations to
the angle based on prior measurement outcomes sk<i), the
client will ask the server to measure the qubit with respect
to the angle δi = φi + θi + ripi mod 2pi, where the binary
parameter ri is chosen randomly. The server reports each
measurement outcome si which the client flips if ri = 1.
In the case of an honest server, this procedure yields the
correct outcome of the computation. Moreover, regardless
of the malicious activity of the server the client’s privacy
is unconditional - the protocol is blind (see the Appendix
section B for details).
This blindness, however, only holds if the client can pre-
pare the needed qubits perfectly. In a practical implemen-
tation, imperfection is inevitable and perfect blindness can-
not be achieved. For this reason, a notion of approximate
blindness is required.
Approximate blindness.— A difficulty to characterize the
UBQC protocol is that it is adaptive. However, as far as
blindness is concerned, the reported outcomes si of the
server do not matter; they only affect the correctness of
the protocol [28]. Hence one can assume si = 0 (i.e. the
server measurement always projects into the +1 eigenvalue,
similar to a post-selection scenario), and since the random
parameters ri can be chosen in advance, the need for the
adaptive structure can be ignored. Therefore, blindness
can be studied through the following joint state of the client
and server:
piidealAB =
1
24S
∑
−→
φ ,−→r
⊗
i∈[S]
|φi〉〈φi| ⊗ |ri〉〈ri|︸ ︷︷ ︸
Client (A)
⊗ |+θi〉〈+θi | ⊗ |δi〉〈δi|︸ ︷︷ ︸
Server (B)
,
which contains all the relevant information pertaining to
the security of a run of a UBQC protocol as seen by the
server. The client has also access to the angles θi. How-
ever, these angles do not constitute the secret the client
wishes to hide - for blindness only the ri parameters and
the (adapted) computation angles are relevant. Thus in
the presented joint state we explicitly place the client’s se-
cret in the client’s register, and all information accessible to
the server in the server’s register. In this classical-quantum
(cq) state, S denotes the overall size of the computation.
The client’s register contains the user’s secret classical in-
formation - the computational angles φi characterizing the
desired computation, and the ri parameters chosen ran-
domly and unknown to the server. The server’s register
contains quantum information - the qubits in states |+θi〉
which are sent by the client, as well as the measurement
3angles δi. Note that φi, ri and δi are all represented by
classical, orthogonal states.
If the information shared by the client and the server can
be described by the state piidealAB , then a malicious server
cannot learn anything about the computation of the client
[1]. Since the security holds for any action of the server,
any UBQC protocol described by a state of the form
(1A ⊗ E)piidealAB (1)
for any completely positive trace preserving map E (rep-
resenting any possible deviation from the protocol by the
server) is equally blind. We refer to such states as uncondi-
tionally blind states and define the family F of such states
as follows:
F = {(1A ⊗ E)piidealAB |E is a CPTP map} . (2)
In order to analyse the impact of imperfections caused by
a realistic implementation, we consider the settings where
the client sends general states ρθi instead of the perfect
states |+θi〉. In this case, the joint state representing all
the information exchanged in the protocol is given by:
pi
{ρθi}
AB =
1
24S
∑
−→
φ ,−→r
⊗
i∈[S]
|φi〉〈φi| ⊗ |ri〉〈ri|︸ ︷︷ ︸
Client
⊗ ρθi ⊗ |δi〉〈δi|︸ ︷︷ ︸
Server
. (3)
We can now introduce the notion of -blindness:
Definition 1. A UBQC protocol with imperfect client
preparation described by the shared joint state pi
{ρθi}
AB is -
blind if the trace distance between the family of uncondi-
tionally blind states and the state pi
{ρθi}
AB is less than :
min
piEAB∈F
1
2
‖pi{ρθi}AB − piEAB‖ ≤  (4)
Such a notion of security is particularly desirable as it
is composable [11, 21–23]. One can also extend it to a
more general setting considering prior knowledge about the
computation (see the Appendix, section C).
If the states ρθi generated by the client are uncorrelated
(which holds for instance if the process determining the
parameters θi is random and memoryless), the distance
between the perfectly blind state and the approximate state
pi
{ρθi}
AB can be bounded in terms of the distance between the
individual states ρθi and the corresponding perfect qubit
states |+θi〉. In particular, defining
prep = max
θi
1
2
‖ρθi − E(|+θi〉〈+θi |)‖ (5)
for some CPTP map E independent of all θi, then one can
show (see the Appendix, section C) that
min
piEAB∈F
1
2
‖pi{ρθi}AB − piEAB‖ ≤ Sprep. (6)
This means that the ability to prepare good approxima-
tions of the states |+θi〉 translates into the ability to per-
form approximately-blind universal quantum computing.
This, however, is not completely satisfying from the
client’s perspective. Indeed, the client can only achieve
a given value of prep in practice, meaning that for a fixed
security parameter , she cannot perform a computation
with more that /prep steps. In order to allow for compu-
tation of arbitrary size, it is necessary to prepare arbitrary
good qubits and the solution is to delegate this task to the
server, who is assumed to be much more powerful than the
client.
We proceed by presenting such a Remote Blind qubit
State Preparation (RBSP) protocol where the client only
needs to prepare weak coherent pulses with a given po-
larization. The requirements for the client are therefore
minimal. In particular, they are the same as in most prac-
tical implementations of discrete-variable QKD. The diffi-
culty here is transferred to the server who has to perform
a quantum non-demolition measurement to obtain the de-
sired qubit. As we will show, using the RBSP protocol
S times, the client can reach a joint state pi
{ρθi}
AB which is
ε-close to the family F of perfectly blind states.
UBQC with Remote Blind qubit State Preparation using
weak coherent pulses.— The RBSP protocol is designed to
serve as a substitute for the process of sending one individ-
ual perfect random qubit which allows for imperfect devices
and channel.
Ideally, its outcome will satisfy the following properties:
(A) the state in the server’s possession is E(|+θ〉〈+θ|) for a
CPTP map E , independent of θ known to the client alone –
guaranteeing perfect blindness, see Eq. (5); (B) the proto-
col is never aborted in the honest server scenario – guaran-
teeing robustness of the encompassing UBQC; (C) in the
honest server scenario, the map E is the identity – guaran-
teeing the correctness of the UBQC protocol.
When imperfections are taken into account, the UBQC
using RBSP in the preparation phase approaches the prop-
erties of blindness and robustness asymptotically. Hence,
we are interested in the following properties: -blindness,
as described above, and -robustness which guarantees that
the honest abort probability is less than . Despite the im-
perfect preparation stage, we also show that the correctness
of the protocol holds in the honest scenario, whenever the
client does not abort.
To run the RBSP protocol, the client sends a se-
quence of N weak coherent pulses (small amplitude, phase-
randomized coherent states) with random polarization σ
in the set {0, pi/4, . . . , 7pi/4} to the server. If the trans-
mittance of the channel from the client to the server is
supposed to be at least T , then the mean photon number
of the source is set to µ = T . This value of µ = T is
optimal for our security analysis, however other values are
in principle admissible as well. The introduced phase ran-
domization simplifies the security analysis and causes the
state emitted from the source to be:
ρσ =
∞∑
k=0
pk|k〉〈k|σ
where |k〉σ := |+σ〉⊗k corresponds to k photons, occur-
ring with probability pk = e
−TT k/k!, with polarization σ.
Each pulse is then a probabilistic mixture of Fock states.
The Poissonian distribution obtained here is not crucial for
the RBSP protocol. For instance, it would work equally
well (with re-adjustment of parameters) with any source
realizing a mixture of polarization encoded photon num-
4ber states, such as polarized thermal states, provided that
the probability of getting a single photon is not too small.
The server then performs non-demolition photon number
measurements on the pulses he receives, declaring the num-
ber outcomes to the client. This additional requirement on
the quantum server, while a challenging task has already
been experimentally implemented [24]. At this point, the
client checks the number of reported vacuum states - if
this number is greater than N(e−T
2
+ T 2/6), she aborts
the protocol. A higher value would be indicative to either
a lossier than believed channel, or more importantly, that
the server lied in an attempt to cheat.
If the protocol was not aborted, the server performs the
interlaced 1D cluster computation subroutine (I1DC), us-
ing the photons obtained by the number measurement of
the received coherent pulses. In this subroutine, the server
couples the first and the second qubit (i.e. photons) with
the interaction ctrl-Z.(H⊗1), and the first qubit of the pair
is then measured in the Pauli X basis and the measurement
outcome is sent to the client. The remaining qubit is then
coupled to the third qubit in the input set and measured
in the same basis. This process is repeated until only one
qubit remains unmeasured, in some state |+θ〉.
Using her knowledge about the polarizations of each of
the pulses initially sent, and the reported binary string of
outcomes, the client can compute the angle θ (see the Ap-
pendix section D for details). The pair θ (held by the
client) and |+θ〉 (held by the server), is the required out-
come of the RBSP protocol.
The intuition behind this protocol is the following. The
I1DC subroutine is such that if the server is totally igno-
rant about the polarization of at least one photon in the 1D
cluster, then he is also totally ignorant about the final angle
θ. In order to exploit this property, the client should make
sure that the server will at least once measure a single pho-
ton and put it in the cluster. The cheating strategy for the
server consists in claiming he received 0 photon when he
received 1 and claiming he received 1 when he in fact mea-
sured several (in which case he can learn something about
their polarization). In order to avoid this attack, the client
simply verifies that the reported statistics of the server are
compatible with the assumed transmittance of the channel.
Note that the server cannot learn anything useful, even if
he deviates from the prescribed I1DC subroutine if one of
the weak coherent pulses generated one photon, and was
declared as such. We now give more quantitative state-
ments which are proven in the Appendix (together with
detailed descriptions of both RBSP and I1DC).
For the described RBSP protocol, property (A) holds ex-
cept with probability pfail and properties (B) and (C) hold
except with probability pabort. These probabilities pabort
and pfail can be bounded as functions of the transmittance
T and the parameter N as follows:
pfail, pabort ≤ exp
(
−NT
4
18
)
. (7)
Using the bound on pfail, the trace distance between the
perfectly blind qubit state and the state ρθ generated by
RBSP can be bounded as
1
2
∥∥ρθ − E(|+θ〉〈+θ|)∥∥ ≤ pfail
for a fixed CPTP map E independent of θ. From this,
by the criterion given in expression (6), the bound given
in Eq. (7) and the union bound, we have that a pro-
tocol using the RBSP generated states is -blind with
 ≤ S exp (−NT 4/18) , where T is a lower bound on the
channel transmittance, and N the number of states used
in each instance of RBSP. These results are proven in de-
tails in the Appendix and collected in the following main
theorem:
Theorem 1. A UBQC protocol of computation size S,
where the client’s preparation phase is replaced with S calls
to the coherent state Remote Blind qubit State preparation
protocol, with a lossy channel connecting the client and the
server of transmittance no less than T , is correct, -robust
and -blind for a chosen  > 0 if the parameter N of each
instance of the Remote Blind qubit State preparation pro-
tocol called is chosen as follows:
N ≥ 18 ln(S/)
T 4
.
We acknowledge that the RBSP protocol is not immune
to noise in the channel or to significant preparation errors
on the side of the client. A method of performing RBSP
in a fault tolerant way, by adapting techniques used to
ensure the fault tolerance of UBQC itself [1, 8, 26], is under
the investigation of the authors. However, noise can only
jeopardize the correctness of our protocol, but never the
guaranteed security levels.
Conclusions and outlook.— In this work we have ad-
dressed the security of UBQC under the presence of im-
perfections through the concept of -blindness. Following
this we have given a Remote qubit State Preparation pre-
protocol which allows a client, with access to weak coherent
pulses only, to enjoy UBQC with arbitrary levels of secu-
rity.
The transition from the idealized setting of UBQC using
single photon qubits to the present protocol using weak
coherent pulses brings UBQC significantly closer to real-life
applications for, e.g. an unconditionally secure quantum
network. The parallel with the evolution of QKD is also
very interesting. Note that in QKD, weak coherent pulses
were not very attractive for long distance communication
before the invention of protocols with decoy states [25].
Indeed, these decoy states made the optimal intensity µ
of the attenuated laser be roughly a constant, in contrast
with the optimal µ ≈ T without decoy states. In the case
of UBQC, it might also be the case that decoy states could
improve the optimal value of µ and therefore significantly
decrease the required number weak coherent pulses used in
an instance of RBSP for a given computation.
Acknowledgements.— We thank Erika Andersson for in-
sightful discussions. We would also like to acknowledge
the hospitality of the Telecom ParisTech Quantum Group
where this work was initiated during the visits by all the au-
thors. VD is supported by EPSRC (grant EP/G009821/1),
EK is supported by EPSRC (grant EP/E059600/1) and AL
received financial support from the EU ERC Starting grant
PERCENT. This work was done while AL was at ICFO.
5Appendix
A Outline
In section B , we give a detailed description of the UBQC protocol, the definition of blindness and the statement of
the main theorem guaranteeing blindness of UBQC from [1]. Section C gives the definitions of -blindness in presence of
prior knowledge about the computation and the derivation of the expression (6) from the main paper. This expression
links the trace distance between ideal prepared qubits and imperfectly prepared states with the blindness parameter 
of the encompassing UBQC which uses these imperfect states. In Section D , we give a detailed description of the I1DC
subroutine, with the proof of its correctness, and in Section E , we present the details of the entire Remote Blind State
Preparation (RBSP) protocol. We prove the security characteristics of RBSP claimed in the main paper. Finally, in
the last section, we derive the characterization of the states generated be RBSP in terms of the criterion given by the
expression (5) from the main paper, which is the crux of our main security theorem for UBQC with weak coherent pulses.
B Universal Blind Quantum Computation
For the detailed overview of the UBQC protocol, we will assume the familiarity with the measurement-based quantum
computing, for more details see [16? ]. Suppose the client has in mind a unitary operator U that is implemented with a
measurement pattern on a brickwork state Gn×m (Figure 1) with measurements given as multiples of pi/4 in the (X,Y )
plane with overall computation size S = n×m. This pattern could have been designed either directly in MBQC or from
a circuit construction. Each qubit |ψx,y〉 ∈ Gn×m is indexed by a column x ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a row y ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Thus
each qubit is assigned a measurement angle φx,y, a set of X-dependencies Dx,y ⊆ [x−1]× [m] and a set of Z-dependencies
D′x,y ⊆ [x−1]× [m] . Here, we assume that the dependency sets Xx,y and Zx,y are obtained via the flow construction [19].
During the execution of the pattern, the actual measurement angle φ′x,y is computed from φx,y and the previous
measurement outcomes in the following way: let sXx,y = ⊕i∈Dx,ysi be the parity of all measurement outcomes for qubits
in Xx,y and similarly, s
Z
x,y = ⊕i∈D′x,ysi be the parity of all measurement outcomes for qubits in Zx,y.
Then φ′x,y = (−1)s
X
x,yφx,y + s
Z
x,ypi .
Protocol 1 implements a blind quantum computation for U .
We assume that the client’s input and output of the computation are built into U . In other words, the client wishes
to compute the results of some fixed single qubit measurements in the (X,Y ) plane of the state U(|+〉 . . . |+〉). Note
however, that the protocol could be easily extended to deal with arbitrary classical or quantum input and output [1].
Protocol 1 Universal Blind Quantum Computation
1. Client’s preparation
For each column x = 1, . . . , n,
for each row y = 1, . . . ,m,
1.1 the client prepares the state |ψx,y〉 ∈ {|+θx,y 〉 := 1√2 (|0〉+ eiθx,y |1〉) | θx,y = 0, pi/4, . . . , 7pi/4}, where the defining angle
θx,y is chosen uniformly at random, and sends the qubits to the server.
2. Server’s preparation
2.1 The server creates an entangled state from all received qubits, according to their indices, by applying ctrl-Z operators
between the qubits in order to create a brickwork state Gn×m.
3. Interaction and measurement
For each column x = 1, . . . , n
For each row y = 1, . . . ,m
3.1 The client computes φ′x,y where s
X
0,y = s
Z
0,y = 0.
3.2 The client chooses a binary digit rx,y ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random, and computes δx,y = φ′x,y + θx,y + pirx,y.
3.3 The client transmits δx,y to the server, who performs a measurement in the basis {|+δx,y 〉, |−δx,y 〉}.
3.4 The server transmits the result sx,y ∈ {0, 1} to the client.
3.5 If rx,y = 1, the client flips sx,y; otherwise she does nothing.
In the main text and in this Appendix, for simplicity, we have used single indexing for all the involved parameters: the
measurements angles φi, the random variables ri and θi, the messages to the server δi (characterising the measurement
angles to be performed) and the server’s messages to the client si (measurement outcomes). In particular, one has
δi = (−1)sXi φi + sZi pi + θi + ripi. It was shown in [1] that this protocol is correct, i.e., if both the client and the server
follow the steps of the protocol then the classical outcome are the results of some fixed single qubit measurements of the
state U(|+ . . .+〉). These classical outcome corresponds to the signals si generated by the measurements of the final layer
of the brickwork state then bit flipped if the corresponding parameter ri was 1 and left as they are if the corresponding
6...
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
FIG. 1: The brickwork state, Gn×m, a universal resource state for measurement-based quantum computing requiring only single
qubit measurement in the (X,Y ) plane [1]. Qubits |ψx,y〉 (x = 1, . . . , n, y = 1, . . . ,m) are arranged according to layer x and row y,
corresponding to the vertices in the above graph, and are originally in the |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) state. Controlled-Z gates are then
performed between qubits which are joined by an edge. The rule determining which qubits are joined by an edge is as follows: 1)
Neighbouring qubits of the same row are joined; 2) For each column j = 3 mod 8 and each odd row i, the qubits at positions (i, j)
and (i + 1, j) and also on positions (i, j + 2) and (i + 1, j + 2) are joined; 3) For each column j = 7 mod 8 and each even row i,
the qubits at positions (i, j) and (i+ 1, j) and also on positions (i, j + 2) and (i+ 1, j + 2) are joined.
ri was zero. Moreover, the server will not learn anything about the client’s computation, i.e., the protocol is blind with
respect to the following definition:
Definition 2. We say a protocol P on input X is blind while leaking at most L(X), where L(X) is any function of the
input if:
1. The distribution of the classical information obtained by the server in P depends only on L(X).
2. Given the distribution of classical information described in 1 and L(X), the state of the quantum system obtained
by the server in P is fixed.
Theorem 2. [1] Protocol 1 is blind while leaking at most the dimensions of the brickwork state, i.e. an upper bound
on the input size and the depth of the computation.
Equivalently, blindness implies that in Protocol 1, from the server’s point of view, the distribution of the computa-
tional angles, φi, is uniform and the final classical output is one-time padded [29], see [1] for the proof. Moreover, in the
setting where the server’s prior knowledge exists, the server does not acquire any new knowledge about the angles φi
through the UBQC protocol.
C Approximate blindness with prior knowledge
In UBQC, the unitary transformation U that the client wishes to perform is encoded with a vector of angles
−→
φ =
(φ1, . . . , φS). In general, it is reasonable to consider the scenario where the server may have prior information about the
transformation U the client wishes to run. Since, in the framework of UBQC, the computation is encoded in the angles
φi the server’s prior knowledge can be modelled by assigning a non-uniform a priori probability distribution p(
−→
φ ). If the
delegated computation protocol is blind, then the posterior distribution for the server should be equal to the prior one.
This was established for the original UBQC protocol [1].
While the UBQC protocol is inherently adaptive, one can show that the si values do not contribute towards the
blindness purposes and only effect the correctness of the protocol. Recall that after the initial qubits have been sent
from the client to the server (i.e. having fixed the ‘pre-rotation’ angles θi), the possible transcripts of the communication
between the client and the server depend on two sequences of binary parameters: the declared measurement results si
sent by the server, and the (random) choices of the parameters ri chosen by the client. The classical information sent
by the client is easily seen to depend on ri + si mod 2 (see step 3.5 of UBQC protocol). Since the parameters ri are
chosen at random and unknown to the server, so are the values ri + si mod 2. Hence every reporting strategy chosen by
the server will result in responses from the client which are independent from the choice of the servers reporting strategy.
So we may fix the reporting strategy (and the measurement outcomes) without the loss of generality.
In what follows we define -blindness for a UBQC with imperfect client preparation and prior knowledge. For the more
special case where there is no prior knowledge, addressed in the main text, one need just set the probability distribution
p(
−→
φ ) to be uniform. Blindness can be studied through the following joint ideal blind state, with a priori probability
distribution p(
−→
φ ) and relative to the CPTP map E , defined as
pi
E, p(−→φ )
AB = 1Client ⊗ EServer
 1
2S
∑
−→
φ ,−→r
p(
−→
φ )
⊗
i∈[S]
|φi〉〈φi| ⊗ |ri〉〈ri|︸ ︷︷ ︸
Client
⊗ (|+θi〉〈+θi | ⊗ |δi〉〈δi|)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Server
 .
which corresponds to the entirety of information, pertinent to the blindness of a UBQC protocol run, the client and the
server share in the post-selected setting where all the signals si are set to 0. This is, as we noted, done without the loss of
7generality. Additional information the client and the server have access to would include the classical descriptions of the
angles θ. However, these angles do not constitute the secret the client wishes to hide. The server may learn something
about these angles, but what blindness requires is that this knowledge reveals nothing about the computational angles,
or the hidden r parameters. The presented ideal state is suitable for addressing this question, by explicitly placing the
client’s secret in the client’s register, and all information accessible to the server in the server’s register.
Here, the map E is introduced because the server might deviate from the original protocol by applying such a map,
as we have done in the setting with no prior knowledge in our paper. However, because he cannot get any information
about the client’s secret by performing such an operation, the final state remains as blind as in the absence of this map.
Correspondingly, we define the family Fp(−→φ ) of ideal blind states with respect to prior knowledge p(−→φ ) as follows:
Fp(
−→
φ ) =
{
pi
E, p(−→φ )
AB | E is a CPTP map
}
.
Any protocol characterized by a state in Fp(−→φ ) is as secure as the ideal UBQC protocol with prior knowledge p(−→φ ).
Again, like in the setting with no prior knowledge, the correctness of the protocol can be guaranteed only if the map E is
the identity. In general, the state describing a given protocol does not correspond to an ideal state, but is given by the
following expression:
pi
ρ{θi}i , p(
−→
φ )
AB =
1
2S
∑
−→
φ ,−→r
p(
−→
φ )
⊗
i∈[S]
|φi〉〈φi| ⊗ |ri〉〈ri|︸ ︷︷ ︸
Client
⊗ ρθi ⊗ |δi〉〈δi|︸ ︷︷ ︸
Server
. (8)
Definition 3. A UBQC protocol with imperfect client preparation and prior knowledge p(
−→
φ ), in which the client sends
states of the form ρθi instead of the perfect states |+θi〉 in the preparation phase is called an -blind UBQC protocol with
imperfect states and prior knowledge p(
−→
φ ), if the trace distance between the overall joint state given with the expression
(8) and the family Fp(−→φ ) of unconditionally blind joint states with prior knowledge is less than :
min
pi
E,p(−→φ )
AB ∈Fp(
−→
φ )
1
2
‖piρ{θi}i ,p(
−→
φ )
AB − piE,p(
−→
φ )
AB ‖ ≤  .
The above criterion is equivalent to
min
E
1
2
‖piρ{θi}i , p(
−→
φ )
AB − piE,p(
−→
φ )
AB ‖ ≤ 
where the map E ranges over all CPTP maps.
This notion of approximate security makes a crucial use of the trace distance between the state obtained while running
the actual protocol and an ideal state. This approach has been already used in the context of quantum cryptography
and particularly for quantum key distribution, where the -security of a protocol is defined analogously. The importance
of the trace distance comes from the fact that it is closely linked to the maximal probability of distinguishing the actual
protocol from the ideal one. Therefore, if this probability is arbitrary small, then the actual protocol is arbitrary secure.
Next we compute how an approximate preparation of the states |+θi〉 affects the blindness of the overall protocol. We
wish to bound the distance
min
E
‖piρ{θi}i , p(
−→
φ )
AB − piE, p(
−→
φ )
AB ‖
where the minimization is over all possible CPTP maps E acting on the system in the possession of the server. First,
we can restrict ourselves to the maps E which act individually and identically on the subsystems containing the qubits
|+θi〉〈+θi |
min
E
∥∥∥∥piρ{θi}i , p(−→φ )AB −piE, p(−→φ )AB ∥∥∥∥≤ minE,i.i.d.
∥∥∥∥piρθi , p(−→φ )AB −piE, p(−→φ )AB ∥∥∥∥ .
This clearly holds as the minimization of the right-hand side of the expression above is just the minimization restricted
to the subset of the minimization space of the left-hand side of the expression. One has
8∥∥∥∥piρ{θi},p(−→φ )AB − piE,p(−→φ )AB ∥∥∥∥ = 12S
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
−→
φ ,−→r
p(
−→
φ )
⊗
i∈[S]
|φi〉〈φi||ri〉〈ri|ρθi |δi〉〈δi| −
⊗
i∈[S]
|φi〉〈φi||ri〉〈ri|E(|+θi〉〈+θi |)|δi〉〈δi|
∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤ 1
2S
∑
−→
φ ,−→r
p(
−→
φ )
∥∥∥∥∥∥
⊗
i∈[S]
|φi〉〈φi||ri〉〈ri|ρθi |δi〉〈δi| −
⊗
i∈[S]
|φi〉〈φi||ri〉〈ri|E(|+θi〉〈+θi |)|δi〉〈δi|
∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤ 1
2S
∑
−→
φ ,−→r
p(
−→
φ )
∥∥∥∥∥∥
⊗
i∈[S]
ρθi −
⊗
i∈[S]
E(|+θi〉〈+θi |)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤ 1
2S
∑
−→
φ ,−→r
p(
−→
φ )
∑
i∈[S]
∥∥ρθi − E(|+θi〉〈+θi |)∥∥ . (9)
Although the variables θi are drawn uniformly at random initially, their distribution, given δi and some prior knowledge
about the angles φi is not uniform. While the expression (9) could be refined further, this general derivation becomes
rather cumbersome, and is omitted here. Now we can characterize the quality of the qubit preparation by the parameter
prep defined as:
prep = max
θ
1
2
∥∥ρθ − E(|+θ〉〈+θ|)∥∥ .
We then obtain: ∥∥∥∥piρ{θi}i ,p(−→φ )AB − piE,p(−→φ )AB ∥∥∥∥ ≤ 12S ∑−→
φ ,−→r
p(
−→
φ )
∑
i∈[S]
∥∥ρθi − E(|+θi〉〈+θi |)∥∥
≤ 1
2S+1
∑
−→
φ ,−→r
p(
−→
φ )Sprep = 2Sprep.
Hence, in such a scenario, the obtained UBQC protocol is -blind if:
Sprep ≤  . (10)
This proves the bound given in Eq. (6) in the main text.
D Interlaced 1D cluster computation
The Interlaced 1D cluster computation protocol, used as a subroutine in RBSP, is described in Protocol 2.
Protocol 2 Interlaced 1-D Cluster computation (I1DC)
• Input: A sequence of k states (|+σl〉)kl=1 for σl ∈R { jpi4 }7j=0.
• Output: A binary string of measurement outcomes s = (s1, . . . , sk) and the state |+θ〉, where
θ =
k∑
l=1
(−1)tlσl , (11)
where the binary components ti are given as follows:
ti =
{ ∑k−1
j=i si mod 2, for i < k
0 for i = k
(12)
• Computation steps:
1. For i = 1 to (k − 1)
1.1 Apply the unitary ctrl-Z(H ⊗ 1) to qubits i and i+ 1.
1.2 Measure qubit i in the Pauli-X basis, obtaining the outcome si.
2. Return the string s = (s1, . . . , sk) and the remaining non-measured qubit in the state |+θ〉.
In the RBSP protocol, an honest server will follow the presented I1DC subroutine exactly. He will have sent the
measurement outcomes s = (s1, . . . , sk) to the client who will then compute the angle θ using the formulas 11 and 12.
For the correctness of the encompassing RBSP protocol, we need to show that the angle the client computes is the same
as the angle parametrizing the state kept by the server. This constitutes the correctness of the I1DC protocol, and we
give it with the following lemma:
9Lemma 4. Protocol 2 is correct.
Proof. We will prove by induction that the state of the output qubit in the interlaced 1-D computation protocol performed
on the input of k qubits in the states {|+σl〉}kl=1, given the sequence of measurement outcomes (s1, . . . , sk−1) is the state
|+θ〉, where
θ =
k∑
l=1
(−1)tlσl (13)
where the binary parameters (t1, . . . , tk) are computed as follows:
ti =
{ ∑k−1
j=i si mod 2, for i < k,
0 for i = k.
(14)
For the basis of the induction we verify that the claim holds for the first non-trivial case, k = 2. Consider the state
ctrl - Z(H ⊗ 1)|+σ1〉 ⊗ |+σ2〉
It is easy to check that the state of the second subsystem, after the measurement of the Pauli-X observable on the first
subsystem of the state is the state |+σ2+(−1)s1σ1〉, where s1 = 0 corresponds to the measurement outcome associated
to the post-measurement state |+〉 and s1 = 1 to the outcome associated to the post-measurement state |−〉. Then,
according to Equation (12), t1 = s1 and t2 = 0, and then Equation (11) gives
θ = (−1)t1σ1 + (−1)t2σ2 = (−1)s1σ1 + σ2,
which is the angle corresponding to the resulting state for the case k = 2.
Assume then the step of the induction, i.e. that the claim holds for the input size k = n, and let us then show that it
then also holds for k = n + 1. Consider the case where the computational steps of the I1DC protocol have been run to
the nth step, i.e. to finish off the protocol, the output qubit of the first n steps of the computation needs to be entangled
to the (n+ 1)st qubit using the prescribed interaction and measured in the Pauli X eigenbasis. Let (s1, . . . , sn−1) be the
measurement outcomes of the first n− 1 measurements. Then by the step of the induction the state of the output qubit
of the first n steps is |+θ′〉 where
θ′ =
n∑
l=1
(−1)t′lσl
and
t′i =
{ ∑n−1
j=i si mod 2, for i < n,
0 for i = n.
If the entangling interaction is then applied on this resulting qubit |+θ′〉 and the remaining qubit |+σn+1〉, and the first
qubit is then measured in the Pauli X eigenbasis, by the basis of the induction, the resulting state is |+θ〉 where:
θ = (−1)snθ′ + σn+1.
This in turn can be expanded as
θ = (−1)snθ′ + σn+1
= (−1)sn
n∑
l=1
(−1)t′lσl + σn+1
= (−1)sn
n∑
l=1
(−1)(
∑n−1
j=i si mod 2)σl + σn+1
=
n∑
l=1
(−1)(
∑n
j=i si mod 2)σl + σn+1
=
n+1∑
l=1
(−1)tlσl
for
ti =
{ ∑n−1
j=i si mod 2, for i < n+ 1,
0 for i = n+ 1.
Hence, the I1DC protocol is correct. 
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Protocol 3 Remote Blind qubit State Preparation with weak coherent pulses with parameters (N,T )
1. Client’s preparation
1.1 The client generatesN weak coherent pulses with mean photon number µ = T and a randomized phase and a polarisation
σl (for l = 1, . . . , N). These states are described by
ρσl = e−µ
∞∑
k=0
µk
k!
|k〉〈k|σl . (15)
The polarisation angles σl are chosen uniformly at random in {kpi/4 : 0 ≤ k ≤ 7}. The client stores the sequence
(σ1, . . . , σN ).
1.2 The client sends the states {ρσl}l to the server.
2. Server’s preparation
2.1 For each state he receives, the server performs a non-demolition measurement of the photon number, obtaining a
sequence of N classical values and N post-measurement states. If the measured photon number was greater than zero,
the server keeps one photon, discarding the rest.
2.2 The server reports the string (n1, . . . , nN ) to the client.
3. Client-server interaction
3.1 The client verifies that the reported number of vacuum states is not too large with respect to the tolerated value of
the transmittance T of the quantum channel between the client and the server. More precisely, if this number is larger
than N(e−T
2
+ T 2/6), then the client aborts the protocol.
Otherwise the protocol continues.
3.2 The server discards the systems for which he measured zero photon. Each subsystem with nl > 0 photons measured,
parametrized by the polarisation σ, is interpreted as a system of nl qubits in the state |+σl〉. Only one qubit copy per
received state is kept, and the total remaining number of qubits is M .
3.3 Using the qubits from the step above and respecting the sending order, the server performs the I1DC computation (see
Protocol 2), obtaining the sequence t = (t1, . . . , tM ) and keeping the resulting state |+θ〉.
3.4 The server reports the string t to the client.
3.5 Using her knowledge about the angles σl of the qubits used in the I1DC procedure by the server, and the received
outcome string t, the client computes θ with formula (11).
E Remote Blind qubit State Preparation
The Remote Blind qubit State Preparation protocol (RBSP) is described by Protocol 3. In order to prover the
security characteristics of RBSP, we prove the following properties which together with the properties of the original
UBQC protocol in [1] prove the claims in the main text:
(A) Upon the completion of the RBSP protocol the state in the server’s possession is E(|+θ〉〈+θ|) for some CPTP map
E (independent of θ) and the client alone knows the angle θ, except with probability pfail;
(B) The protocol is never aborted in the honest server scenario, except with probability pabort;
(C) In the honest server scenario, the map E is the identity if the client did not abort and the protocol is correct.
The correctness of the protocol in property (C) above means that upon the successful completion of the RBSP protocol,
the server has the state |+θ〉〈+θ| where θ is the angle the client has computed.
We claim that he probabilities pfail and pabort are bounded above in terms of the protocol parameter N , and relative
to the transmittance lower bound T as follows:
pfail, pabort ≤ exp
(
−NT
4
18
)
.
Proof. We begin by proving Claim (C), which is a consequence of the correctness of the interlaced 1-D computation
protocol, Lemma 4. For Claim (C) to hold, first it needs to be shown that, if the protocol was not aborted, and the
server is honest, then the server’s system is in the state |+θ〉 for some θ known only to the client. In the case where the
server is honest, prior to the call to the interlaced 1D cluster computation subroutine, the server’s system is in the state
k⊗
l=1
|+σk〉
where the angles σk are known to the client. Then the server will perform the interlaced 1D cluster computation using
this system as the input, reporting the bit string (t1, . . . , tk), which is related to the measurement outcomes, as explained
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in Protocol 2. The client will then compute the angle θ using the formula (11). Hence, by Lemma 4 this angle is
precisely the angle defining the state |+θ〉 in the server’s subsystem. What remains to be seen is that the angle of this
resulting state is chosen uniformly at random. Recall that the angle θ is given with θ =
k∑
l=1
(−1)tlσl =
k−1∑
l=1
(−1)tlσl + σk,
and since the angles σk are polarisation angles and they are assumed to be chosen uniformly at random, the angle θ is
also distributed uniformly at random. This proves that the client alone knows the value of θ.
To prove Claim (B), we will need to bound the abort probability when the server is honest. Finally, for Claim (A),
we will need to show that if the protocol is not aborted then the state in the server’s possession is E(|+θ〉〈+θ|) for some
CPTP map E , where θ is the angle the client will compute based on the servers feedback, except with probability pfail.
We address these two required properties throughout the rest of this section. In Lemma 5, which we present later, we
show that if during the run-time of the protocol the server measures a single photon in one of the states (coherent pulses)
sent by the client and declares it as such, then if the client does not abort the protocol, the resulting state with the server
is E(|+θ〉〈+θ|) for a CPTP map E , where θ is the angle the client will compute based on the servers feedback. Hence, the
probability of this not happening, is the failure probability, pfail.
Here, we note pk = e
−µ µk
k! the probability of receiving k photons if the channel is perfect (unit transmittance), and
pTk = e
−Tµ (Tµ)k
k! the probability of receiving k photons if the quantum channel between the client and the server is a
lossy channel of transmittance T . In fact, since the events with 2 or more photons are not distinguished by our protocol,
we note p≥2 (resp. pT≥2) the probability of obtaining 2 or more photons for a perfect channel (resp. a channel with
transmittance T ).
In what follows, we derive the bounds for both pfail (blindness) and pabort (robustness). For each state that the server
receives, he is supposed to perform a non demolition measurement of the photon number and to announce this number
to the client. Here, we are only interested in three types of events:
• “event 0” when the server measures 0 photon. This event has probability pT0 in the case of an honest server since
the transmission channel is characterized by a transmittance T .
• “event 1”, when the server measures exactly 1 photon. The whole point of the protocol is to make sure that at least
once, this event occurs and the server has to announce that he received one photon. If this is the case, by Lemma
5 we are guaranteed the server has the desired state E(|+θ〉〈+θ|) for a CPTP map E .
• “event 2”, when the server measures at least 2 photons. In the case of a malicious server, one has to suppose that
the probability of such an event is p≥2 (instead of pT≥2), meaning that we assume that the server has the ability to
replace the imperfect quantum channel by a lossless one.
As we will explain below, without loss of generality we may assume that the server always performs the number
measurement. Then, if the server is malicious, his only strategy consists in declaring he received 0 photon when he
detected 0, declaring he received 0 photon when he detected 1, and declaring either 1 or more when he detected at least 2
photons. Any other strategy will either mean that the server will admit to having measured one photon in which case, by
Lemma 5 the protocol will end in a satisfactory state. Alternatively, the server has to report that he measured 1 photon
when he in fact measured none. In this case in the setting where the client did not abort, the angle the client computes
will be uncorrelated to the state generated by the server. However, this corresponds to a state of the form E(|+θ〉〈+θ|)
for a CPTP map E where the map E is the contraction to the state in the server’s possession, independent of the client’s
calculated angle θ. We will prove this formally in Lemma 6 presented later.
Let us denote with N the total number of states sent by the client, M0,M1 and M2 the number of states for which
the server measured respectively 0, 1 or at least 2 photons. Also define N0, N1 and N2 to be the respective numbers of
states for which the server reported having measured 0, 1 or at least 2 photons. Note that the numbers M0,M1 and M2
are well-defined since the server does not gain anything by not measuring the photon number for each state he receives.
This is because the measurement operators commute with the state sent by the client, which are diagonal in the Fock
basis. We can therefore assume that he performs this non-demolition measurement.
These various quantities are related through the normalization constraint
M0 +M1 +M2 = N0 +N1 +N2 = N.
For an honest server, one has N0 = M0, N1 = M1, N2 = M2. A malicious server will however choose a strategy such that
N0 = M0 + M1. Consider the probability that the protocol aborts when the server is honest. Hoeffding’s bound [? ]
immediately gives an upper bound for pabort, for any ∆ > 0 we have
pabort = Pr
[
M0
N
− pT0 ≥ ∆
]
(16)
≤ exp(−2∆2N).
The only way the protocol fails is that the malicious server applies the strategy described above, (that is, to pretend
he did not receive anything unless he actually received at least two photons) while not being detected. Let us consider a
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tolerance ∆ which will be optimized later. One has:
pfail = Pr
[
N0
N
− pT0 ≤ ∆
]
≤ Pr
[
M0 +M1
N
− pT0 ≤ ∆
]
≤ Pr
[
1− M2
N
− pT0 ≤ ∆
]
≤ Pr
[
M2
N
− p2 ≥ 1− pT0 − p≥2 −∆
]
≤ exp(−2∆˜2N), (17)
with
∆˜ := 1− pT0 − p≥2 −∆.
In order to get a non-trivial bound for pfail, the parameter ∆˜ should be positive and bounded away from 0. One has
∆˜ + ∆ = 1− e−Tµ − (1− (1 + µ)e−µ)
= e−µ
(
1 + µ− e(1−T )µ
)
.
If we fix µ = T , we obtain
∆˜ + ∆ = e−T
(
1 + T − eT (1−T )
)
≥ T
2
3
.
Hence, choosing ∆ = ∆˜ ≥ T 2/6, one gets
pfail, pabort ≤ exp
(
−NT
4
18
)
.

While the probabilities pfail and pabort can in principle be made arbitrary small for any (positive) value of the transmit-
tance, one notes that the required number of weak coherent pulses scales like log(1/)/T 4 for small T , making the scheme
less efficient. In general, this subroutine will be used S times during the complete UBQC protocol. The probabilities that
blindness or robustness is jeopardized during this whole process can be bounded easily with the union bound and they
are simply increased by a factor S. This means that the correct scaling for the parameter N should be (log(S/))/T 4.
In the above, we considered one specific implementation of the remote blind qubit state preparation protocol using
weak coherent pulses. This choice was made because weak coherent pulses are arguably the simplest quantum states to
prepare in a laboratory. However, the protocol could be easily generalised to any source of light that emits a mixture of
Fock states. In particular, the protocol would work equally well with a thermal source of light. The only characteristics
which are required are that the probability of emitting exactly one photon is strictly positive, and that the client is able
to calibrate her source well enough. In other words, reasonable bounds on the probability of emitting a given number of
photons should be available.
Next, we present the lemmas we need to complete the proof above.
Lemma 5. If the server measured a weak coherent pulse sent by the client to contain one photon, declared it as such
honestly to the client, and the client did not abort in the presented remote blind qubit state preparation protocol, then the
state in the possession of the server after the termination of the protocol is E(|+θ〉〈+θ|) for a CPTP map E where θ is the
angle computed by the client.
Proof. We begin the proof by describing the system of the client and the server after the server has reported the binary
string {ti}i to the client, which he has to do to prevent the client from aborting. The client has the following:
• A sequence of angles {σk}Mk=1 which the client has encoded in the polarization of the initially sent coherent pulses,
corresponding to those pulses for which the server has announced a non-zero declared photon number. In this
sequence the angles come in multiples, with individual indexes, the multiplicity corresponding to the announced
number of photons declared. The total number of photons declared is then M.
• A sequence of binary digits {tk}k reported by the server, where the last digit tM is zero.
13
By assumption, the server measures at least one pulse for which he gets one photon and declares one photon. Without
loss of generality, let us assume that this is the case for the final pulse characterized by its polarization angle σM . The
client will then calculate the value θ =
∑M−1
i=1 σi + σM .
On the server’s side, prior to declaring the binary digit outcomes, the server’s quantum state can in all generality be
written as:
ησ1,...,σM−1 ⊗ |+σM 〉〈+σM | ,
where the state |+σM 〉 is the state of the single copy declared qubit. The rest of the server’s system depends on the
number measurement outcomes, but can always be written in the generic form ησ1,...,σM−1 . In the case the server was
honest, his system will be exactly of the form:(|+σ1〉〈+σ1 | ⊗ . . .⊗ |+σM−1〉〈+σM−1 |)⊗ |+σM 〉〈+σM | ,
where the states before the final state may come in multiplicities which match the declared number measurement outcomes.
Note that, whatever procedure the server may run on the system in his possession, in the spirit of the Stinespring
dilation theorem,f can always be represented as a unitary transform U on the input system, augmented by an ancillary
system, followed by a measurement on the output of the overall unitary transform. The classical outcome will, in general,
encode the binary digits {tk}k the server has to report to the client, as in the case of no report the protocol is aborted.
We emphasize that we are not assuming anything about the classical outcome - it may be a result which depends on the
states the server recieved from the client, it may be chosen randomly by the server, or it may be selected. The state in
the server’s possession prior to measurement, ρprior, can then be viewed as the result of a CPTP map (which depends on
the state ησ1,...,σM−1) applied on the state |+σM 〉〈+σM |
ρprior = Eησ1,...,σM−1 (|+σM 〉〈+σM |).
This is only possible because the angle σM does not depend on any other angles. For simplicity, we shall fix the angles
σ1, . . . , σM−1 and simply write the state prior to measurement:
ρprior = E(|+σM 〉〈+σM |).
Since the angle σM was chosen uniformly at random, known to the client, the state of the server’s system is:
piserver = 1/8
∑
σM
E(|+σM 〉〈+σM |).
Following this, the server will measure a part of his subsystem, obtaining the sequence of binary digits
−→
t = {tk}k
which he reports to the client. The state of the system after measurement (taking into account all possible outcomes)
can be written as:
piserver = 1/8
∑
σM
∑
−→
t
pσM (
−→
t )E−→
t
(|+σM 〉〈+σM |),
where pσM (
−→
t ) is the probability of outcome
−→
t given that the input state was σM , and E−→t are the quantum operations
which depend on the outcome. Note that: ∑
−→
t
pσM (
−→
t )E−→
t
= E (18)
for all angles σM . As the two sums commute, we can write this state as:
piserver=1/8
∑
−→
t
∑
σM
pσM (
−→
t )E−→
t
(|+σM 〉〈+σM |). (19)
Recall that a fixed sequence
−→
t along with the fixed sequence of angles σ1, . . . , σM−1 defines the angle θ:
θ =
∑M−1
k=1 (−1)tkσk + σM .
Note that the value of θ attains all possible angles when σM goes through all possible angles, for
−→
t and σ1, . . . , σM−1
fixed. Now, since the sum: ∑
σM
pσM (
−→
t )E−→
t
(|+σM 〉〈+σM |) ,
for a fixed sequence
−→
t goes through all the possible angles, this sum is, for every sequence
−→
t , equal to:
piserver = 1/8
∑
−→
t
∑
θ
pθ(
−→
t )E−→
t
(|+θ〉〈+θ|).
Due to property (18), this final state is of the form E(|+θ〉〈+θ|). 
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Lemma 6. If the server measured a weak coherent pulse sent by the client to contain zero photon, and declared it as
containing one photon to the client, and the client did not abort in the presented remote blind qubit state preparation
protocol, then the state shared by the client and the server after the termination of the protocol is of the form E(|+θ〉〈+θ|)
for some CPTP map E.
Proof. We will extensively use the setup and the arguments of the proof of Lemma 5. Assume that it is the lth declared
photon that the server does not possess. Then for the sequence of binary digits (t1 . . . , tk) the server will have reported
as the alleged classical outcome of the interlaced 1D cluster computation, the angle the client computes is given as:
θ =
k∑
i=1
(−1)tkσi ,
which can be written as:
θ =
∑
i∈{1,...,l−1,l+1,...k}
(−1)tiσi + (−1)tlσl .
Let us fix all the σi angles except σl and all the reported binary digits ti except tl. The general state with the server
after the remote blind state preparation protocol can then be written as:
piserver =
1∑
tl=0
p(tl)
∑
σl
1
8
ηtl
where η is the state in the hands of the server, which may depend on tl, and p(tl) is the probability of the server reporting
tl to be one or zero. Note that neither the probability p(tl) nor the final state η
tl can depend on σl. The angle θ in the
expression above for any fixed tl goes across all possible values as σl ranges across all possible values. Hence the sum may
be written in terms of the angle θ rather than σl as:
piserver =
1∑
tl=0
p(tl)
∑
θ
1
8
ηtl .
Also, since ηtl does not depend on σl it does not depend on θ so we can factor it out of the sum
piserver =
1∑
tl=0
p(tl)
(∑
θ
1
8
)
ηtl =
1∑
tl=0
p(tl)η
tl .
Let η be the quantum state
1∑
tl=0
p(tl)η
tl , then we have
piserver = η
which implies
piserver = Eη(|+θ〉〈+θ|)
where Eη is a CPTP map which is the contraction to the fixed state η. 
F Characterization of the states generated by RBSP
As we discussed before, the only source of imperfection in the implementation of the UBQC protocol comes from
the fact that the client cannot generate exactly the states |+θ〉, but only an approximate state ρθ. Using the remote
blind qubit state preparation protocol with parameters (N,T ), the state generated instead of |+θ〉 can be described, in a
worst-case scenario from the client’s point of view, as
ρθ = (1− pfail)ES(|+θ〉〈+θ|)⊗ |0〉〈0|+ pfail|θ〉〈θ| ⊗ |1〉〈1|, (20)
where pfail ≤ exp
(
−NT 418
)
and |θ〉 is a classical state giving full information about θ [30]. This state corresponds to the
worst case scenario because we assume that if the server manages to avoid “event 1” (measuring a single photon in a
weak coherent pulse and declaring it as such), corresponding to the indicator register with the state |1〉〈1|, which happens
with probability pfail at most, then the server obtains complete information about the angle θ chosen by the client. As
we have shown, in any other cases the server has the state ES(|+θ〉〈+θ|) for some CPTP map ES , relative to the angle θ
computed by the client. In modelling this, we considered an additional quantum register with values |0〉 or |1〉, available
to the server, which tells whether the remote blind qubit state preparation succeeded or not, as it can be seen in Equation
15
(20). This is a classical-quantum state, and the classical register containing either |0〉 or |1〉 represents the information
whether the server managed or failed to cheat and the server clearly has access to this information.
We have that
1
2
∥∥ρθ − E(|+θ〉〈+θ|)∥∥ ≤ pfail
for every θ and the CPTP map E(ρ) := ES(ρ) ⊗ |0〉〈0|. This map simply applies the CPTP map ES to the input state
and appends the state |0〉. Hence, in order to characterize blindness, one just needs to consider the condition described
in Equation (10), that is Sstates ≤  and to note that
pfail ≤ S exp
(
−NT
4
18
)
.
The latter claim holds as we have taken into account that the remote blind qubit state preparation protocol is used S
times during the complete UBQC protocol and the probabilities that blindness or robustness is jeopardized during this
whole process can be bounded easily with the union bound as they are simply increased by a factor S. Hence, choosing
N = 18 ln(S/)/T 4 allows the client to obtain -blindness for the overall UBQC protocol for arbitrary small values of .
The above explanation, given the proven bounds on the probabilities pfail and pabort, proves the main theorem of our
paper.
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